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stirred up in the Balkans for the sake of increasing Teutonic power, the hope of future peace demands the defeat of this policy and the erection of a barrier against its resumption. Since his book was written, this question appears to have been settled definitively by the break-up of Austria. A second purpose of Mr. Woods is to show that a type of settlement which would revise the treaty of Bucharest of 1913 in the direction of better conformity with the principle of nationality can alone promise relatively permanent peace in the Balkans. Since unfortunately the peace conference of 1919 has seen fit to revise this treaty somewhat in the other direction, a word as to Mr. Woods's recommendations is in order. He would have had the cession of 1913 in the Dobruja restored by Rumania to Bulgaria, except for Silistria; he would have arranged an impartial ascertainment of the wishes of the people of Macedonia, and a redistribution of that territory according to their wishes; he would not have cut Bulgaria off from the Aegean Sea, but would have widened her outlet to that sea by the inclusion of Kavala; he would have provided protection for the Jews of Salonica; he would have enlarged Albania a little at the south and given it Ipek, Diakova, and Pristina as necessary market-towns at the north. He would have compensated Rumania and Serbia for unwilling alien elements withdrawn from their rule, by granting to each the addition of its kinsmen in other directions; as for Greece, he saw neither in her equivocal part during the war nor in the actual ethnic situation any justification for a considerable enlargement of her territory.

In regard to Turkey, his convictions are not so clear, except that he would throw open the Dardanelles to the warships of all nations, and shatter the German control of the Bagdad railway.

Wide knowledge has preserved Mr. Woods from incorporating many errors of fact. The King of the Hejaz was not in possession of Medina in July, 1918. The map of the military highways of the Balkan Peninsula needs some revision, now that more is known about the improvement of roads and the building of railroads during the war. The other maps and the illustrations are satisfactory.

ALBERT HOWE LYBYER.

Der Weltkrieg: Vorläufige Orientierung von einem Schweizerischen Standpunkt aus. Von S. ZURLINDEN. Zweiter Band. (Zürich: Orell Füssli. 1918. Pp. xxvi, 725.)

THE scale upon which Herr Zurlinden intends to complete his work on the World War is indicated by the fact that the present volume, the second, ends with the year 1908, the account of the beginning of the conflict being reserved for the fourth volume. The whole history is to be comprised in six volumes, those already published containing more than seven hundred large octavo pages each, with much fine print.

It is obvious that a work of this character, the labor of one man, must

of necessity be of the nature of a compilation. In substance it is a veritable encyclopedia of European history since the Congress of Vienna. When it is finished and provided with a general index, it will be a valuable work of reference, perhaps the most comprehensive single repository covering the period from 1815 to the end of the Great War. Until the general index is furnished, however—for there is none in the separate volumes—it will be a constant exasperation to those who consult these bulky tomes to realize that so many important details are somewhere in these pages and so difficult to locate.

As an encyclopedia, aside from its provoking concealment of really rich contents, this work when completed will be of value in every reference library. New and interesting details gathered from a great variety of sources are here woven together in a consecutive narrative, sometimes overburdened with digressions, but meticulous in the effort to omit nothing which the reader might wish to know on the subject. The notes at the end of the volume present a useful bibliographical annex and indicate wide and careful research in contemporary writings little known to American readers.

The present volume, with the subtitle "The Historical Basis of the World War" (first half) begins with the fall of Napoleon I., the first chapter being "After the Congress of Vienna", followed by "In the Time of the Crimean War", "Bismarck's Wars of Conquest", "Bismarck's Peace", "Triple Alliance and Entente", "The Colonial Era", and "The Eastern Question".

Writing, as he says, from a Swiss point of view, Zurlinden measures every doctrine and every event by the standards of democracy. Bismarck is naturally his *bête noire*, and to him more than to any other he ascribes the perversion of the German mind and responsibility for the German spirit of military aggression. "No one", he affirms, "has so brutally as this man of blood and iron yielded himself to a policy of pure might and force, no one has used it more unscrupulously. . . . The wars of 1864, 1866, and 1870 are Bismarck's personal work."

The writer does not confine himself to assertions. He enters analytically into the causes and procedure of each conflict, and with an unanswerable array of evidence—some of it not to be found in English writings—he traces the hand of Bismarck in preparing the wars which he had planned for the domination of Prussia. So persistent and irresistible was Bismarck's power of will that Kaiser William I. uttered the helpless sigh, "It is difficult to be emperor under such a Chancellor!"

The story of the annexation of the Danish provinces is told with much circumstantiality. "I had all the world against me", declared Bismarck, "the Crown Prince and Crown Princess on account of relationship, the King, I know not for what reason, Austria, the small German States, and England, through jealousy. Even the inhabitants of Schleswig-Holstein", referring to the German population there, "would not hear of annexation".

New side-lights are thrown on the Hohenzollern candidature for the throne of Spain. Although Bismarck was not the first to suggest it, he gave it his earnest support, and when it was virtually rejected in Prussia secretly promoted it for the purpose of irritating France. At a dinner party given in Berlin on March 15, 1870, by Prince Karl Anton, father of the candidate Prince Leopold, at which King William, the Crown Prince Friedrich and many ministers were present, including Bismarck, Moltke, and Roon, the subject was seriously considered; and all, except the Crown Prince Friedrich, were favorable to the project. The latter expressed a warning that it was a dangerous step to take. Minister Delbrück asked Moltke, "If Napoleon were to take offense, are we prepared?" To which Moltke replied with a confident affirmative. King William concluded that he would neither order nor forbid the acceptance, and the next day Prince Leopold decided that he would not pursue the matter further; but Bismarck, to whom the Prussian minister at Madrid had admitted that the popularity of the candidature in Spain was slight and the election uncertain, nevertheless continued negotiations with the Spanish deputy Salazar. So secret were the communications, that besides the ordinary cipher, Bismarck used a special key, in which King William and Karl Anton figured as "banquiers", the transaction as a "loan", and Leopold as "compagnon de voyage". Moreover the chancellor kept in Spain three special agents, the cool intriguer Theodor von Bernhardi, Lothar Bucher, his "right hand", and a certain Major von Versen, known as the "tolle Versen". As a prelude to the Ems telegram, this is not without interest.

The chapter on "Bismarck's Peace"—for Bismarck was on many occasions a peacemaker—brings out with clearness his conception of war as an instrument of diplomacy. As Prince von Bülow has said: "Bismarck regarded it as his task to prevent the implication of Europe from Moscow to the Pyrenees and from the North Sea to Palermo in a war whose consequences no man could foresee and after the ending of which, as he then expressed it, one might hardly know why he engaged in it. Prince Bismarck", he continues, "regarded the prevention of a coalition-war against us as his greatest service in foreign politics, and to the end of his official life incessantly strove to avoid such a calamity".

One of the purposes of the writer of this history appears to be, to show how, when the imperial power Bismarck created fell into the keeping of less capable guardians, the political conceptions at the base of his system of statecraft inevitably led to the destruction of all his work; for, as he quotes Baumgarten as saying, Bismarck had an infinitely developed feeling for the state, but no feeling for the people. For him the people, society, the mass of mankind, were not really living things.

DAVID JAYNE HILL.